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Abstract. This paper analyses an experiment which studies the acqui-
sition of the linguistic competence required to communicate logical com-
binations of categories from the wisdom of the crowds perspective. The
acquisition of such competence encompasses both the construction of a
set of logical categories by each individual agent and of a shared language
by the population. The processes of conceptualisation and language ac-
quisition in each individual agent are based on general purpose cognitive
capacities such as discrimination, invention, adoption and induction. The
construction of a shared language by the population is achieved using a
particular type of linguistic interaction, known as the evaluation game,
which gives rise to a shared language system of logical constructions as
a result of a process of self-organisation of the individual agents’ inter-
actions, when these agents adapt their languages to the expressions they
observe are used more often by other agents.
1 Introduction
The wisdom of the crowds main thesis is that a diverse collection of indepen-
dently deciding individuals is likely to make certain types of decisions and pre-
dictions better than individuals or even experts. This principle seems to work
for many naturally occurring systems such as ant colonies, bird ﬂocks or moving
traﬃc ﬂows, and it has been successfully applied to market prediction [1, 2] and
multi-agent computer systems as well [3]. However not all crowds (groups) are
wise, and it is therefore important to identify some criteria which separate wise
crowds from irrational ones. Four such criteria are described in [4]: (1) diversity
of opinion, enough variance in approach, thought processes and private informa-
tion is necessary; (2) independence, agents’ decisions should not be determined
by other agents; (3) decentralisation, agents should be able to specialise and draw
on local knowledge; and (4) aggregation, some mechanisms should be provided
for turning individual decisions into collective ones.
Two additional important aspects of the wisdom of the crowds approach are
also pointed out in [5]: the necessity of designing methods for describing how
a group thinks as a whole; and the importance of disagreement and contest as
mechanisms that enable the generation and selection of optimal decisions.
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Experiments studying the eﬀectiveness of the wisdom of the crowds approach
often incorporate some functions which allow assessing the performance of a
group in a given task, thus making it possible to establish a comparison between
the collective performance and that of its individuals. Some of these functions are
sometimes referred to as collective intelligence quotient (or cooperation quotient)
and compared with the individual intelligence quotient (IQ).
There are, however, other deﬁnitions of collective wisdom which not only
focus on consensus-driven decision making, but on other aspects of it such as:
shared knowledge arrived at by individuals and groups; shared intelligence that
emerges from the collaboration, collective eﬀorts and competition of many indi-
viduals; or collective learning over time. For example, [6] deﬁnes the collective in-
telligence phenomenon as ’the capacity of human communities to evolve towards
higher order complexity and harmony, through such innovation mechanisms as
diﬀerentiation and integration, competition and collaboration’. A step forward
in this direction is crowdsourced crisis mapping [7, 8], which tries to bridge the
gap between the creation and sharing of knowledge by global communities and
the necessary action to solve social problems based on that information. Inter-
esting projects addressing related issues such as the construction of a democratic
political culture [9] or generalised access to education using crowd-based socio-
cognitive systems [10, 3] are additional examples.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Firstly, we present the results
of a multi-agent experiment in which a group of autonomous software agents try
to construct at the same time a set of logical categories and a shared language.
Then, we analyse such results from the wisdom of the crowds perspective, i.e.
taking into account the deﬁnitions of wisdom of the crowds and criteria for
distinguishing wise crowds from irrational ones introduced in this section.
The multi-agent experiment is not described in detail in this paper, although
its main characteristics have been outlined in the abstract. A complete descrip-
tion of the evaluation game and the mechanisms the agents use for discrimina-
tion, induction and adaptation can be found in [11]. A summary of the main
steps of the evaluation game, the induction rules and the adaptation strategies
used by the agents are also given in appendixes A y B.
2 Results of the Experiment
As mentioned above, the multi-agent experiment analysed in this paper studies
the acquisition of the linguistic competence required to communicate logical
combinations of basic categories, such as ’up and to the left’ (i.e. [and, up, left]),
’not up or to the right’ (i.e. [if, up, right]) or ’either up or to the right, but
not both’ (i.e. [xor, up, right]). The acquisition of such competence encompasses
both the construction of a set of logical categories by each individual agent and
of a shared language by the population. In particular, the set of logical categories
the agents can construct in this experiment is the set of Boolean functions of one
or two arguments not, and, nand, or, nor, xor, iﬀ, if, nif, oif and noif. Boolean
functions not, and, or, if and iﬀ correspond to the connectives of propositional
logic ¬,∧,∨,→ and ↔ respectively. The semantics of Boolean functions nand,
nor, xor, nif, oif and noif, assuming they are applied to propositionsA andB, can
be deﬁned by the following formulas ¬(A∧B),¬(A∨B), (A∨B)∧¬(A∧B),¬(A →
B), B → A,¬(B → A) respectively.
The experiment involves a population of autonomous software agents which
are made to interact with each other playing language games. The particular
type of language game used in the experiment analysed in this paper is called the
evaluation game. It is played by two agents, a speaker and a hearer. It requires the
agents to communicate about subsets of objects of the set of all the objects in a
given context. In order to do so, the speaker must construct a logical combination
of categories that is true for the subset of objects it tries to communicate about
and false for the rest of the objects in the context, i.e. a conceptualisation of
the subset. Then, it should transform this conceptualisation into an utterance
using its lexicon and grammar, and communicate that utterance to the hearer.
The hearer then tries to parse the utterance, reconstruct its meaning and use
it to identify the subset of objects the speaker had in mind. Depending on the
outcome of the game speaker and hearer use diﬀerent strategies to expand and
adapt their internal languages in order to be more successful in future language
games. All agents in the population play both the role of speaker and that of
hearer in diﬀerent language games.
In the experiment, the agents are initially endowed with a set of cognitive
abilities for discrimination, invention, adoption and induction that are hypoth-
esised to be necessary for seeing the emergence of possible language strategies
to be successful in the evaluation game. Then, they are made to play a series
of language games, where they conﬁgure possible strategies and try them out.
The goal of the experiment is to ﬁnd out whether the population as a whole
succeeds in the evaluation game, i.e. communicates eﬀectively, and to observe
the conceptualisations and language strategies that emerge in the population as
a result of the processes of collective invention and negotiation.
In the particular multi-agent experiment analysed in this paper we have
performed several simulation runs. In each simulation the agents ﬁrst play 700
evaluation games about subsets of objects which can be discriminated using a
single category or the negation of a category. In this part of the simulation the
population reaches a communicative success of 94% after playing 100 games (see
ﬁgure 1). Communicative success is the average of successful evaluation games in
the last ten games played by the agents. Next, the agents play 6000 evaluation
games about subsets of objects which require logical combinations of one or two
categories for their discrimination. In this part of the simulation the population
reaches a communicative success of 100% after playing 3600 evaluation games. As
it can be observed in ﬁgure 1, this level of communicative success is maintained
until the end of the simulation. The results shown in the ﬁgure are the average
of ten independent simulation runs with diﬀerent random seeds.
At the end of a typical simulation run the set of logical categories and gram-
matical constructions built by each agent are not necessarily equal to the set of
logical categories and grammatical constructions built by other agents. However
Fig. 1. Evolution of communicative success for a population of three agents.
they are compatible in the sense that they guarantee the unambiguous commu-
nication of logical combinations of one or two categories.
Let us focus now on the set of logical categories and grammatical construc-
tions built by three agents at the end of a particular simulation run (see table
1). All the agents have constructed a grammar rule for expressing negations, and
all of them use the same expression (i.e. cp) for referring to logical category not.
All the agents have constructed logical categories for all commutative boo-
lean functions of two arguments (i.e. iﬀ, xor, and, nand, or and nor) as well;
and all of them prefer the same expressions for naming such categories (j, wbt,
y, nb, dol and ssq respectively).
In order to express logical formulas constructed with binary Boolean func-
tions, the agents use two types of grammar rules. Which rule is used for express-
ing a given formula depends on the Boolean function appearing in that formula
and the syntactic category of the expression associated with such Boolean func-
tion. Syntactic category c1 is used in grammatical constructions which place the
expression associated with the ﬁrst argument of a Boolean function in the second
position of the sentence and the expression associated with the second argument
of the Boolean function in the third position of the sentence. Syntactic category
c2 is used in grammatical constructions which place the expression associated
with the ﬁrst argument of a Boolean function in the third position of the sen-
tence and the expression associated with the second argument of the Boolean
function in the second position of the sentence. The expression associated with
a Boolean function is always placed in the ﬁrst position of the sentence in this
experiment.
We now consider non-commutative binary Boolean functions (i.e. if,
nif, oif and noif ). All the agents have constructed logical category nif, which
Grammar a1
s([not,X],Q) → cp, s(X,P), {Q is P · 1}
s([X,Y,Z],T) → c1(X,P), s(Y,Q), s(Z,R), {T is P · Q · R · 1}
c1(nif,R) → ml, {R is 1}
c1(nor,R) → nb, {R is 1}
c1(or,R) → y, {R is 1}
s([X,Y,Z],T) → c2(X,P), s(Z,Q), s(Y,R), {T is P · Q · R · 1}
c2(and,R) → j, {R is 1}
c2(xor,R) → dol, {R is 1}
c2(iﬀ,R) → ssq, {R is 1}
c2(nand,R) → wbt, {R is 1}
c2(if,R) → why, {R is 1}
Grammar a2
s([not,X],Q) → cp, s(X,P), {Q is P · 1}
s([X,Y,Z],T) → c1(X,P), s(Y,Q), s(Z,R), {T is P · Q · R · 1}
c1(nif,R) → ml, {R is 1}
c1(nor,R) → nb, {R is 1}
c1(or,R) → y, {R is 1}
s([X,Y,Z],T) → c2(X,P), s(Z,Q), s(Y,R), {T is P · Q · R · 1}
c2(and,R) → j, {R is 1}
c2(xor,R) → dol, {R is 1}
c2(iﬀ,R) → ssq, {R is 1}
c2(nand,R) → wbt, {R is 1}
c2(if,R) → why, {R is 1}
Grammar a3
s([not,X],Q) → cp, s(X,P), {Q is P · 1}
s([X,Y,Z],T) → c1(X,P), s(Y,Q), s(Z,R), {T is P · Q · R · 1}
c1(nif,R) → ml, {R is 1}
c1(nor,R) → nb, {R is 1}
c1(or,R) → y, {R is 1}
c1(oif,R) → why, {R is 1}
s([X,Y,Z],T) → c2(X,P), s(Z,Q), s(Y,R), {T is P · Q · R · 1}
c2(and,R) → j, {R is 1}
c2(xor,R) → dol, {R is 1}
c2(iﬀ,R) → ssq, {R is 1}
c2(nand,R) → wbt, {R is 1}
Table 1. Logical categories and grammatical constructions built by each agent at
the end of a particular simulation run. In principle, the agents can construct logical
categories not, and, nand, or, nor, if, nif, oif, noif, iﬀ and xor, although they do
not necessarily construct all of them. Boolean functions not, and, or, if and iﬀ have
the standard interpretation (¬,∧,∨,→ and ↔ respectively). The rest can be deﬁned
as follows: (A nand B) is equivalent to ¬(A∧B), (A nor B) to ¬(A∨B), (A nif B)
to ¬(A → B), (A oif B) to (B → A), (A noif B) to ¬(B → A), and (A xor B) to
¬(A ∨B) ∧ ¬(A ∧B).
corresponds to the negation of an implication, all of them use the same expression
(i.e. ml) for referring to it, and all of them associate the expression ml with
syntactic category c1.
None of the agents has constructed logical category noif. But this does not
prevent them from characterising any subset of objects, because formulas [noif,
A, B] and [nif, B, A] are logically equivalent and all the agents have constructed
logical category nif.
Let us focus now on diﬀerences. Agents a1 and a2 have constructed logical
category if (i.e. logical implication), whereas a3 has not. On the other hand,
agent a3 has constructed logical category oif, while agents a1 and a2 have not.
However the lack of only one of these two logical categories does not prevent
any agent from characterising any subset of objects, because formulas [if, A, B]
and [oif, B, A] are logically equivalent. Furthermore, the three agents can always
understand each other. Because the word agents a1 and a2 use for referring to
logical category if (namely why) is the same word agent a3 uses for referring to
logical category oif; and the syntactic category agents a1 and a2 associate with
such word (i.e. c2) is diﬀerent from the syntactic category agent a3 uses for it
(i.e. c1), which means that agent a3 does not invert the order of the expressions
associated with the arguments of oif in the sentence whereas agents a1 and a2
invert the order of the expressions associated with the arguments of if.
3 Discussion
The experiment described in this paper constitutes an example of collective learn-
ing and coordination. As we have explained above the agents construct a lan-
guage system of logical constructions that allows them to communicate logical
combinations of categories. This language system includes a common vocabulary
for logical categories, and a set of grammatical constructions which allow them
to order the expressions associated with the components of logical formulas in
suﬃciently similar ways as to ensure unambiguous communication.
In this section we try to analyse the results of the experiment from the wisdom
of the crowds perspective, focusing on the deﬁnitions of wisdom of the crowds
and criteria for distinguishing wise crowds from irrational ones introduced in
section one.
First of all, does the population make better decisions than individual agents
in the experiment? It might be diﬃcult to answer such a question without know-
ing in detail the mechanisms each agent uses to construct logical categories, in-
vent new words and induce grammatical constructions (which are described in
detail in [11]), but we think it does. The population is able to recognise that
certain binary Boolean functions are redundant. For example, nif and noif can
be used for discriminating the same subsets of objects, and the same happens
with if and oif. Consequently, the language of the population contains only two
words for the four logical categories (if, nif, oif, noif). The mechanisms the in-
dividual agents use for constructing a set of logical categories and grammatical
constructions do not allow them to discover such redundancies for themselves. It
is the interaction with other agents, who use diﬀerent formulas for conceptualis-
ing the same subset of objects, what generates the opportunity of ﬁrst using the
same word for two diﬀerent categories, and then selecting a single meaning for
that word as a result of the selection process that takes place among competing
associations between expressions and meanings both in the individual languages
constructed by each agent and in the language constructed by the population.
The population is also able to discover that the word order of the expressions
associated with the arguments of commutative Boolean functions is irrelevant
for language understanding. This cannot be observed in the grammars shown
in table 1. But in other simulation runs we have performed the word associated
with a commutative Boolean function such as and can be associated with syn-
tactic category c1 in an agent’s grammar and with syntactic category c2 in the
grammar of a diﬀerent agent of the same population. In the current experiment,
the agents themselves are not aware of this fact. Because each agent uses a par-
ticular word order for expressing formulas constructed with each commutative
Boolean function. But the external language spoken by the population shows
that they perfectly understand each other in spite of using diﬀerent word or-
ders for the expressions associated with the arguments of commutative Boolean
functions.
With respect to the four criteria proposed by [4], the agents in the population
have some degree of diversity of opinion, in the sense that they can invent dif-
ferent words for referring to logical categories and order the constituents of sen-
tences in diﬀerent ways. But they basically use the same approach for construct-
ing logical categories and for expressing logical formulas, i.e. they all use word
order as the only syntactic mechanism for disambiguation and non-recursive for-
mulas of one or two arguments for discrimination. They are independent of each
other, because each agent chooses the words and grammatical constructions it
uses for communication taking into account only the scores of the rules in its
own grammar. The scores of such rules depend on the interaction history of the
agent, which is always diﬀerent from the interaction history of the others, thus
providing each individual agent with a diﬀerent perspective of the language used
by the population. The aggregation mechanism used in the experiments is, as
we explained above, the shared language system that emerges as a result of the
self-organisation process of the interactions that take place among the agents
in the population. The mechanisms the agents use to adapt their languages to
the expressions they observe are used more often by other agents favour such
self-organisation process, because each agent tries to use the same expressions
as the others.
The necessity of designing methods for describing how a group thinks as
a whole, pointed out by [5], is addressed in multi-agent experiments studying
language emergence and evolution using a number of functions which evaluate
the performance of the group as a whole. In the present experiment we have
used communicative success, but other functions which compute the similarity
of the agents’ grammars, the discriminating capacity of the set of categories
constructed by the population, or the complexity of the vocabulary and gram-
matical constructions of the language spoken by the population, can be used as
well [12].
Finally, we think that the agent interaction mechanisms used to construct
compatible conceptualisations and a shared language system in the experiment
analysed in this paper might be appropriately adapted and applied to crowd-
based socio-cognitive systems [3] addressing issues such as crowdsourced crisis
mapping [7], the construction of a democratic political culture [9] or the gen-
eralisation of access to education [10]. Because in each of these domains sets
of new concepts and linguistic constructions need to be constructed in order to
accurately reﬂect the reality their users are dealing with and to enable commu-
nication, and the best way of constructing such new language systems is using
mechanisms that enable meaning coordination.
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A The Evaluation Game
The emergence of a shared language system of logical constructions in the pop-
ulation results from a process of self-organisation of the linguistic interactions
that take place among the agents in the population. The particular type of lin-
guistic interaction used in the experiment discussed in this paper is called the
evaluation game. It is played by two agents, a speaker and a hearer, and its main
steps can be summarised as follows.
1. Conceptualisation Firstly both agents, speaker and hearer, are given a
description of a set of objects which constitute the context of the evaluation
game. Then the speaker picks a subset of objects from the context which will
be the topic of the evaluation game. The rest of the objects in the context are
called the background.
The speaker tries to construct a conceptualisation of the topic, that is, a
logical formula which is true for all the objects in the topic and false for all
the objects in the background. It does so by ﬁnding a unary or binary tuple of
categories such that its evaluation on the topic is diﬀerent from its evaluation
on any object in the background. Once it has found a discriminating category
tuple, the speaker tries to ﬁnd a logical category which is associated with the
subset of Boolean values or pairs of Boolean values resulting from evaluating
the topic on that category tuple, and constructs a conceptualisation of the topic
applying this logical category to the discriminating category tuple.
In general an agent can build several conceptualisations for the same topic.
For example, if the context contains objects 1, 2 and 3 such that object 1 is up
and to the left, object 2 is down and to the left, and object 3 is down and to the
right, and the topic consists of objects 1 and 3, then both formulas [iﬀ, up, left]
and [xor, up, right] can be used as conceptualisations of the topic.
2. Generation The speaker tries to generate a sentence for each of its concep-
tualisations of the topic using its lexicon and grammar. It tries to maximise the
probability of being understood by other agents by selecting the sentence with
the highest score, and communicates that sentence to the hearer. The algorithm
for computing the score of a sentence from the scores of the grammar rules used
in its generation is explained in [13].
The agents in the population start with an empty lexicon and an empty
grammar. Therefore they cannot generate sentences for most formulas (concep-
tualisations) at the early stages of a simulation run. In order to let language to
get oﬀ the ground, they are allowed to invent new sentences for those meanings
(conceptualisations) they cannot express using their lexicon and grammar. As
the agents play language games they learn associations between expressions and
meanings, and induce linguistic knowledge from such associations in the form of
grammar rules and lexical entries.
3. Interpretation If the hearer can parse the sentence communicated by the
speaker using its lexicon and grammar, it extracts a formula (a meaning) and
uses that formula to identify the topic. At the early stages of a simulation run
the hearers usually cannot parse the sentences communicated by the speakers,
since they have no prior linguistic knowledge. In this case the speaker points to
the topic, and the hearer adopts an association between its conceptualisation of
the topic and the sentence used by the speaker. Note that the conceptualisations
of speaker and hearer might be diﬀerent, because diﬀerent formulas can be used
to conceptualise the same topic.
4. Adaptation The evaluation game is successful if the hearer can parse the
sentence communicated by the speaker, and its interpretation of that sentence
identiﬁes the topic (i.e. the subset of objects the speaker had in mind) correctly.
Depending on the outcome of the evaluation game, speaker and hearer take
diﬀerent actions. We have explained some of them already (invention and adop-
tion), but they also adapt their grammars to communicate more successfully in
future games.
Coordination of the agents’ grammars is necessary, because diﬀerent agents
can invent diﬀerent words to refer to the same categories, and because the in-
vention process uses a random order to concatenate the expressions associated
with the components of a given formula. In order to understand each other,
the agents must use a common vocabulary and must order the constituents of
sentences in suﬃciently similar ways as to avoid ambiguous interpretations. The
following adaptation mechanisms are used to coordinate the agents’ grammars.
We consider the case in which the speaker can generate a sentence and the
hearer can parse it. If the speaker can generate several sentences for its con-
ceptualisations of the topic, the sentence with the highest score is chosen for
communication and the rest of the sentences are kept as competing sentences.
Similarly if the hearer can obtain several formulas (meanings) for the sentence
communicated by the speaker, the formula with the highest score is selected
as its interpretation of the sentence and the rest of the formulas are kept as
competing meanings.
If the topic identiﬁed by the hearer is the subset of objects the speaker had
in mind, the evaluation game succeeds. The speaker increases the scores of the
grammar rules it used for generating the sentence communicated to the hearer
and decreases the scores of the grammar rules it used for generating competing
sentences. The hearer increases the scores of the grammar rules it used for ob-
taining its interpretation of the sentence and decreases the scores of the rules it
used for obtaining competing meanings. This way the grammar rules which have
been used successfully get reinforced, and the grammar rules which have been
used for generating competing sentences or competing meanings are inhibited.
If the topic identiﬁed by the hearer is diﬀerent from the subset of objects
the speaker had in mind, the evaluation game fails and both agents decrease
the scores of the grammar rules they used for generating and interpreting the
sentence used by the speaker respectively. This way the grammar rules used
without success are inhibited.
The scores of grammar rules are updated replacing the rule’s original score S
with the result of evaluating expression 1 if the score is increased, and with the
result of evaluating expression 2 if the score is decreased.
minimum(1, S + 0.1) (1)
maximum(0, S − 0.1) (2)
B Induction
Besides inventing expressions and adopting associations between sentences and
meanings, the agents use some induction mechanisms to extract generalisations
from the grammar rules they have learnt so far. The induction mechanisms used
in this paper are based on the rules of simpliﬁcation and chunk in [14], although
we have extended them so that they can be applied to grammar rules which
have scores attached to them [13]. The induction rules are applied whenever
the agents invent or adopt a new association to avoid redundancy and increase
generality in their grammars.
Instead of giving a formal deﬁnition of the induction rules used in the exper-
iment, which can be found in [15], we give an example of their application. We
use Deﬁnite Clause Grammar to represent the internal grammars constructed
by the individual agents. Non-terminals have two arguments attached to them.
The ﬁrst argument conveys semantic information and the second is a score in
the interval [0, 1] which estimates the usefulness of the grammar rule in previous
communication. Suppose an agent’s grammar contains the following rules.
s(light, S) → clair, {S is 0.70} (3)
s(right, S) → droit, {S is 0.25} (4)
s([and, light, right], S) → etclairdroit, {S is 0.01} (5)
s([or, light, right], S) → ouclairdroit, {S is 0.01} (6)
The induction rule of simpliﬁcation, applied to 5 and 4, allows generalising
grammar rule 5 replacing it with 7. In this case simpliﬁcation assumes that
the second argument of logical category ’and’ can be any meaning that can be
expressed by a ’sentence’, because according to rule 4 the syntactic category of
expression ’droit’ is s (sentence).
s([and,light,B], S) → etclair, s(B,R), {S is R·0.01} (7)
Simpliﬁcation, applied to rules 7 and 3, can be used to generalise rule 7
replacing it with 8. Rule 6 can be generalised as well replacing it with rule 9.
s([and,A,B], S) → et, s(A,Q), s(B,R), {S is Q·R·0.01} (8)
s([or,A,B], S) → ou, s(A,Q), s(B,R), {S is Q·R·0.01} (9)
Induction rule chunk I replaces a pair of grammar rules such as 8 and 9
with a single rule 10 which is more general, because it makes abstraction of their
common structure introducing a syntactic category c2 for binary connectives.
Rules 11 and 12 state that the expressions et and ou belong to syntactic category
c2.
s([C,A,B], S) → c2(C,P ), s(A,Q), s(B,R), {S is P ·Q·R·0.01} (10)
c2(and, S) → et, {S is 0.01} (11)
c2(or, S) → ou, {S is 0.01} (12)
Suppose the agent of previous examples adopts or invents the following rule.
s([if, le, up], S) → siclairdroit, {S is 0.1} (13)
Simpliﬁcation of rule 13 with rules 3 and 4 would replace rule 13 with 14.
s([if, Q,R], S) → si, s(Q,SQ), s(R,SR), {S is SQ·SR·0.1} (14)
Then induction rule chunk II, applied to 14 and 10, would replace rule 14
with rule 15.
c2(if, S) → si, {S is 0.1} (15)
